Abstract-This paper analyzes the probabilities of data packet loss for both an encrypted channel in self-synchronous cipher feedback mode and a nonencrypted channel, in the space data systems. Simulation results show reasonable agreement with analytical results. When channel bit error probability is lo-' and the total number of packets per frame is 3, the analytical model gives 0.39% packet loss while the simulation gives 0.22% packet loss due to encryption. Although the analysis is performed for the space data systems, the resulting derived equations with minor change will be useful in many packet communication applications.
I. INTRODUCTION HE Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems
T (CCSDS)-a worldwide cooperative effort of national space agencies--began to develop a comprehensive set of standards in the mid 1980's [I]- [4] . The standards cover techniques for data handling, classification, and transmission. Data encryption is required to provide privacy and security in many communications channels, as it is in the space data systems.
The performance analysis of the encrypted CCSDS links is a timely subject. Data packets are more likely to be lost in a encrypted communication system than in a nonencrypted system. This paper analyzes the probabilities of data packet loss for both an encrypted channel and a nonencrypted channel.
Section I1 describes the system models, and Section 111 provides the analysis. The detailed analyses are in the Appendices A and B. Section IV presents the numerical results, and Section V concludes the paper. Fig. 1 shows a simplifies block diagram of the Ku-band single access return link (KSAR) with self-synchronous cipherfeedback data encryption in a typical spacecraft communication link. Source data from digital audio, control and monitor subsystem (CMS) core data, and selected digital video are encrypted by the Data Encryption Standard (DES) encryptor in self-synchronous cipher feedback mode ( Fig. 2 ; described later).
SYSTEM MODELS
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IEEE Log Number 9400577. A frame formatter then forms a 101 12 bit transfer frame (T-frame). The T-frame bits are binary phase-shift keying (BPSK) modulated and transmitted, and white Gaussian noise is shown added to the transmitted signal. Fig. 1 also includes Reed-Solomon (RS) coding with interleaver depth 5, which may or may not be employed. At the receiver, the signal is BPSK demodulated. The BPSK demodulated signal is deinterleaved, decoded (if coding is employed), and decrypted. It is assumed that the coded channel symbols are memoryless because the interleaver and deinterleaver are employed. The burst error effects on the packet transmission are not included in this paper. . The low-order output character from the DES becomes the next key character, &+I, to be used with the next message character, P,+1. Since, after the first M (= 1 in this paper) iterations, the input to the algorithm depends only on the ciphertext, the system is self-synchronizing.
In such a system, if a ciphertext character is lost or in error during transmission, the error propagates forward for M characters, but the system resynchronizes itself and generates correct plaintext after M correct ciphertext characters are receivtd. In other words, when a received ciphertext character C , is in error, the decryptor's future keystream Kn+l, 1. . , K,+M, is wrong and the decrypted plaintext characters P,, P7,+;, . . . , P n +~ are also in error. If the current decryption key K , is in error, a decrypted plaintext character P , (consisting of m bits) is in error and, on the average, half of m-bits are correct and half are incorrect. If the current key K , is correct but the current received cipher character C, is in error, a decrypted plaintext character f ' , is in error with the sape number of errors as the current received cipher character C,. Fig. 3 shows a typical CCSDS T-frame format for a RS coded channel. Each channel access data unit (CADU) of 101 12 bits, called a T-frame, is encrypted except the first 32 bit frame sync marker, the 48 bit virtual channel data unit (VCDU) header, and the 1280-bit RS check symbols for the coded channel, The remaining 8752 bits are encrypted and called the multiplexing protocol data unit (MPDU). An MPDU has a 16 bit MPDU header and contains Np CCSDS source packets. Hence a T-frame has Np packets. Packet length is variable.
Critical blocks of bits in a T-frame for the analysis of packet loss are shaded in Fig. 3 In addition, it is assumed that the ciphertext character C, carrying the block of bits representing an event, e.g., K, and the ciphertext character C, carrying the block of bits representing another event, e.g., Z,, are not neighbors, i.e., the difference between indexes n and m is greater than 1. This assumption and the assumption in the preceding paragram assure that all events, X, Y,, and Z,, i = 1, 2 , . . . , A i are independent. These assumptions are removed, and R-S coding with interleaver depth 5 was used, in the simulation [8].
The simulation yields results somewhat better than analysis results because the assumptions for the analysis are the worst case. It is also assumed that frames are synchronized; and furthermore that data is encrypted frame by frame, with encryption initialization for each frame. Suppose the 16 bits representing the ith packet length information was received in the current ciphertext characJer C , as shown in Fig. 4 . The decrypted plaintext character P , is a binary addition of the current decryption key K, and the current received ciphertext* characterA C,, which can be written as P , = C , @ = C , @ f~(C,-1) where IB is a binary addition and fo is the DES decryption key function. If the previous received ciphertext character C,-1 is in error, the current decryption key I?, is in error, which causes the decrypted plaintext character P , to bejn error. The event yi happens if the current decryption key K, is in error or if the current decryption key I?, is correct but the 16 bit block in the current received ciphertext C , is in error. Thus the probability The probability of packet loss in a T-frame can be expressed as the average number of packets lost in a T-frame divided by the total number of packets in a T-frame; detailed derivations of the probability of packet loss are provided in Appendix A. The probability of packet loss can be written as Pr(Packet Loss) = Pr(W) + P r ( X ) + P r ( Y ) + P r ( Z l )
-P r ( Y ) P r ( Z 1 ) + P r ( W ) P r ( X )
where Pr(W), Pr(X), Pr(Y), and Pr(Zl) are given by and {l-(l-P6)64+(l-P6)64(l-(l-P6)11)}, respectively. and for total number of packets in a T-frame N p 1. 50, all higher order terms of Pb greater than or equal to 2 in (2) are insignificant and (2) can be greatly simplified. Thus, the probability of packet loss can be well approximated as
For small bit error probability P 6 5
where N~R G is the number of stages in the shift register generators which are used for the encryption and decryption keys, NWT is the number of bits in the VCDU channel ID field, N.y is the number of bits in the MPDU first header pointer, N z Z is the number of bits in the ith packet application process ID, and N y 2 is the number of bits in the itlh packet length information. Notice that the approximated probability of packet loss is a linear function of bit error probability Pb, happens, the ith packet is lost. The probability of packet loss in a T-frame can be expressed as the average number of packets lost in a T-frame divided by total number of packets in a T-frame; detailed derivations of the probability of packet loss are provided in Appendix B. The probability of packet loss can be written as
. ( " -. If the channel is nonencrypted, error propagation does not happen. Thus, the probability of packet loss for a nonencrypted channel is the same as equation ( 2 ) and (4) 
The approximated probability of packet loss for a nonencrypted channel is also a linear function of channel bit error probability Pb, and of the number of packets N p in a Tframe. The probability of packet loss for Case 2 is (6) with N, replaced by ( N , + 1 ) / 2 for the same reason stated in the encrypted channel analysis.
where
Pr ( X ) .
For small bit error probability Pb 5 lop5 and for total number of packets in a T-frame N, 5 50, all higher order terms of Pb greater than or equal to 2 in (4) are insignificant
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The channel bit error probability is assumed to be lop5 in this paper. If the channel bit error probability is changed to l o p 6 (or and so on), the probability of packet loss is changed to 10-1 (or lo-' and so on) times the probability of packet loss in this paper because the approximated results are close to exact ones and the approximated probablity of packet loss is a linear function of the channel bit error probability as shown in (3), (3, (6) and (7). Fig. 5 shows the probability of packet loss versus total number of packets N p , for an encrypted channel. Fig. 6 shows the probability of packet loss versus total number of packets N,, for a nonencrypted channel. It is observed that the probability of packet loss is a linear function of the total number of packets in a T-frame. For large Np 2 10, the probability of packet loss in Case 1 (all packets are lost if the zth packet length information is incorrect, i.e., event 1; ) is almost twice that of Case 2 (the current as well as succeeding packets are lost if event Y, happens but 1'1 through x-1 do not happen), which is expected. For small N p , this is not true. If the total number of packets is 1, the probability of packet loss is the same for both cases. This is obvious because there is no distinction between Case 1 and Case 2 strategies for M, -1. which are in reasonable agreement with analytical results. It is observed that analytical results are somewhat larger than simulation results; for example, for an encrypted channel with channel bit error probablity and Np = 3 packets in a T-frame, the analytical result is 0.3952% loss while the simulation result is 0.22% packet loss. As mentioned in Section I1 (System Models), the difference between analysis and simulation IS due to the worst case analysis assumption (Le., the block of bits representing event X , the block of bits representing event I : , and the block of bits representing event Z,, each belong to a different ciphertext character).
V. CONCLUSION
A reasonable model for packet loss analysis was constructed. If VCDU's channel ID or MPDU's first header pointer, both being critical fields, are incorrect, all packets in a transfer frame are lost. If the ith packet length information, also a critical field, is incorrect but all previous packet length information is correct, two cases are considered: Case I ) all packets in a T-frame are lost for the worst case analysis and Case 2) the current as well as succeeding packets are lost but all previous packets are forwarded to the desired destinations. . The probability of packet loss versus total number of packets ,VP in a transfer frame, for a nqnencrypted channel. The channel bit error probability is assumed to be lo-'.
If the ith packet application process ID, another critical field, is incorrect, only the zth packet in a T-frame is lost. The above critical fields can be in error due to not only the channel bit errors in the critical fields but also errors in the previous ciphertext characters of 64 bits located just before each critical field because of error propagation in selfsynchronous cipher feedback mode encryption. In this paper, exact and approximate probabilities of packet loss due to encryption were analytically derived. It is observed that the approximate results are very accurate.
Analytical and simulation results are in reasonable agreement. Analytical results are based on a worst case assumption which yields results somewhat worse than simulation results. When channel bit error probability is and the total number of packets per frame is 3, the analytical result is 0.39% packet loss while the simulation result is 0.22%) packet loss. Also, the probability of packet loss for a nonencrypted channel was considered, and it is smaller than that for an encrypted channel. However, the probability of packet loss for a nonencrypted channel becomes significant as the number of packets increases.
APPENDIX A
In this Appendix, the detailed derivation of the probability of packet loss is provided for an encrypted channel in selfsynchronous cipher feedback mode. Case 1 concerns packet length information, a critical field, and is the case where all packets in a T-frame are lost when the current packet length information is incorrect. The model given in the System Models section for packet loss analysis is used. First, the number of packets lost due to critical field events, W , X , Yt, and 2, (defined in the main text), and their combined events, are calculated, and then the probability of packet loss is represented as the number of packets lost divided by the total number of packets N, in a 7'-frame.
Let event Y be the union of Yi, 2 = 1,. . . , N p . The probability of the event Y is given in (1). If event {WIJXUY} happens, N, packets are lost. The average number of packets lost due to event {W U X U Y} is # of packets lost due to event {W U X U Y}
If event 2, happens, the ith packet in a T-frame i5 lost whether from one bit error or more than one. Let event 2 be the union of Z,, t = 1. . . . , N p . Events 2, and 2, are not disjoint. Event Z can be decomposed into disjoint events Dk, k = 1. . . . , N p .
As an example for Np = 3 packets, Z = D1 U 0 2 U DJ with D~ = ((2, n z2 nZ,) u (z, nZ2 nz3) u (Zl n z2 n z,)}. # of packets lost due to event Z = U Z , = u Dk 
Thus, from (A-1), (A-3), and (A-4), the average total number of packets lost in a frame is N, times {Pr(
Therefore, the probability of packet loss is
which becomes (2).
APPENDIX B
In this Appendix, the detailed derivation of the probability of packet loss is provided for an encrypted channel in selfsynchronous cipher feedback mode. Case 2 concerns an event Y , related to the ith packet length information, i.e., the current and succeeding packets in a T-frame are lost but the previous packets are forwarded to the desired destinations when the current packet length information is incorrect and previous packet length information is correct. The number of packets lost due to other critical events, i.e., events W , X , and Z, are the same as in Case 1.
If event (W U X) happens, N, packets are lost. Thus, the average number of packets lost due to event (W U X ) is # of packets lost due to event (W U X ) = N, Pr (W U X).
(B-1 )
The average number of packets lost due to event Z (which is the union of Z,, i = 1, . . . , N,) is shown in (A-3) which is rewritten as 1) (zl n zz nZ, n z4 n 2,)
2) (z, n zz n z3 nZ, n z,) 3) (zl n z2 n z3 n z, nZ,) 1) (2, nZ2 n z, n z, n z 5 )
2) (Zl n z2 n Z, n Z, n z5) (1 -Pr (Y1))'-' Pr (Y1) in (B-7) is the probability of E,, and the "NP choose k" times Prk (Zl)(l -Pr(Zl))i"P-k is the probability of event Dk. Thus, the average overcount due to event {Z n B } can be written as .
(1 -Pr (~1 )),-1 Pr (~1 )
(2) Prk (21) . (I -Pr ( Z~) )~P -~.
(B-8)
